What if everybody did that? Universalization as a mechanism of moral judgment

Some people feel that it is morally wrong to not vote, but why? From a utilitarian perspective, one vote fewer often makes no practical difference; from a deontological perspective, there is often no rule or law that mandates voting. Current theories of moral psychology struggle, then, to explain why anybody would consider it morally wrong. A very natural answer to this problem comes to mind, however: We ask ourselves, “What if everybody did that”? My aim in this talk is to formalize this unique mode of moral judgment—one that is commonly employed, and yet widely overlooked in contemporary research. I call this mode of moral judgment "universalization" and I will present evidence of the use of this mechanism in adults and pilot data in young children. Finally, I explain how this mechanism fits into a contractualist (agreement-based) theory of moral psychology that I am developing.